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Historical Resistance Movements and 
Modern Euroscepticism
Kamil D. Lungu
Pomona College
Abstract
 This study explores the relationship between historical resistance and their rela-
tionship to modern-day Euroscepticism. It can be seen that within the European Union 
(EU), the political orientation of Eurosceptic parties differs, with some political orientations 
being more popular in some parts of the continent compared to others—Eastern European 
states tend to have right-wing parties, while many Southern European states having left-
wing parties. The author suggests that this is a result of the orientation of the resistance 
movements to the state’s historic authoritarian regime. Case studies were conducted on 
Spain and Poland—two EU with similar sized area, population, and economies—looking 
at their respective resistance movements to authoritarianism and their connection to their 
respective dominate Eurosceptic parties, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) and Podemos. The 
author observed clear links and similarities between the tactics, ethos, and rhetoric between 
these parties and their respective national resistance movements to authoritarianism.
Keywords
  Euroscepticism, authoritarianism, political parties
Historical Resistance Movements and Modern Euroscepticism
7 0 Kamil D. Lungu Pomona College
Introduction
 Since the inception of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1958, the 
Union has grown from a loose economic bloc of six nations to an ever-closer union of 28 
states. The most recent wave of expansion occurred after 2004 with the addition of multiple 
former Eastern Bloc countries. With expansion, comes immense pushback. One of the vis-
ible movements to strengthen itself in the past ten years are Eurosceptic right-wing populist 
parties. Law and Justice in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary have managed to win general elec-
tion in their respective parties, and numerous parties in Scandinavia, the Low Lands, and the 
Baltics have managed to hold a considerable number of seats in their respective parliaments. 
Yet, right-wing populism has not managed to garner immense favor in many Southern Eu-
ropean countries. Golden Dawn in Greece holds less than 8% of the seats in parliament and 
right-wing populist parties do not hold seats in the Spanish or Portuguese parliaments. 
 Even though commentators have suggested that economic anxieties are to blame 
for the rise of right-wing populism, this does not take into count many Southern Mediterra-
nean countries ability to withstand right-wing populism despite economic malaise and crisis. 
Instead, one must look into the complex political histories of these countries, specifically 
their relationship to authoritarianism and resistance. Because Euroscepticism sees the Euro-
pean Union as a threat to national sovereignty and liberty, a country’s Eurosceptic move-
ment’s political orientation is dependent on the political orientation of its past resistance 
movements against authoritarianism. This paper aspires to isolate and identify the process in 
which resistance movements inspire and lead the formation of Eurosceptic parties when a 
member state engages with the projection of European integration. This will be determined 
through case studies of Poland and Spain, both nations from the regions in question that 
have went through similar processes of democratization.
Literature	Review
European Party Politics
 Because of the domination of proportional voting systems and parliamentary de-
mocracy, all EU member states have multi-party systems with a diverse array of parties 
being represent in both national parliaments and in supranational organizations such as the 
European Parliament (EP) (Dinan, 2010, p.245). The two biggest groups that dominate 
European party politics are the Socialists and the Christian Democrats (Dinan, 2010, p.247). 
They lie respectively on the center-left and center-right of the political spectrum and have 
been crucial in pushing European integration; both parties represent demographics that have 
generally benefited from economic integration: heavy industry supporting the Socialists and 
farmers being crucial support for Christian Democratic parties (Dinan, 2010, p. 248). Lib-
eral parties—parties dedicated to both political liberty and economic liberalism—tend to be 
third largest political parties in legislative bodies and too espouse pro-European sentiments, 
mainly because of the possibility for further economic liberalization through integration 
(Dinan, 2010, p. 249).
 Conservative right-wing parties and far-left wing populist parties have a strong 
presence on the European scene and have achieved electoral prominence in both the EP 
and numerous national parliaments, such as Poland’s Sejm and the British House of Com-
mons (Dinan, 2010, p.250). Even though these parties come from very different ends of the 
political spectrum and have contradictory world views, both are hot-beds of Euroscepticism 
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(Dinan, 2010, p.250). Conservative and nationalist parties object to European integration 
because of its threats on national sovereignty and on the preservation of national identities. 
Sentiments range from stressing reforms and addressing the democracy gap to outright dis-
mantlement of the EU. Far-left parties tend to have grievances in regard to the economic 
liberalization and globalization that European integration has brought on, with many of 
these parties being sympathetic to introducing command economies and nostalgic of Com-
munist rule (Dinan, 2010, p.250).
Euroscepticism
 Euroscepticism and its presence in both public opinion and in the electoral systems 
have been the subject of study by many political scientists. British scholars Paul Taggart and 
Aleks Szczerbiak examined the nature of Eurosceptic parties in both EU member and can-
didate states in their article “The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Can-
didate States”. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) were particular interested in the abundance 
and influence Eurosceptic parties had on candidate states in particular (p.2).  Their work is 
key in providing a clear and concise working definitions of Euroscepticism, in which they 
identify two key forms:
1. Hard Euroscepticism, “a principled opposition to the EU and European 
integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their counties 
should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are 
tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration 
as it is currently conceived”
2. Soft- Euroscepticism- “is NOT a principled objection to European integra-
tion or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy 
areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where 
there is a sense that ’national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU’s 
trajectory” (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002, p.7)
Both forms of Euroscepticism center their ideologies on a dichotomy that sets the nation 
and its interests in opposition to the EU and its interests. This usually is manifested in hard 
Eurosceptic rhetoric claiming that the EU is too capitalist, socialist, neoliberal, or bureau-
cratic—depending of course on ideological position of the Eurosceptic (Taggart & Szczer-
biak, 2002, p.8).  Soft-Eurosceptic rhetoric on the other hand focuses more on critiquing 
the pace or objectives of integration, claiming that current agenda of integration goes against 
national interests (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002, p.8).  They then looked at the number and 
performance of both types of parties in EU member and candidate states, finding that soft-
Eurosceptic parties in particular were popular in eastern and central European candidate 
states and that many of them were of a right-leaning orientation (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 
2002, p.16).  Meanwhile, soft-Eurosceptic parties tended to have less electoral influence 
in member states and that hard-Eurosceptic parties tended to be more significant in their 
respective country’s electoral process (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002, p.17).  Eurosceptic par-
ties also tended to be from both ends of the political spectrum in member states (Taggart 
& Szczerbiak, 2002, p.18).  Even though Taggart and Szczerbiak were thorough in their 
identification of Euroscepticism, they failed to look at the reasons why these parties are 
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popular, nor the reason why certain political ideologies are associated with Euroscepticism.
  A number of studies looked at the public and their views on European integration. 
One article by Oxford political scientist Lauren McLaren questioned a common theory for 
one’s support for European integration in which peoples tend to see integration as a cost/
benefit analysis. McLaren (2002) instead argues that people tend not to support European 
integration because of a utilitarian cost/benefit analysis, but because they see integration and 
the EU as threats to cultural identity and the nation-state (p. 560). She looked at the 2000 
Eurobarometer results and isolated the poll responses that looked at feelings towards the EU 
and compared them to the education and occupation of the respondent; she then compared 
that to the Eurobarometer question regarding perceived threats and also compared that with 
the respondent’s education and occupation (McLaren, 2002, p. 560). She notices that in 
both independent variables, lower educated responded and more working-class respondents 
showed higher levels of ill-feelings the EU and perceived more a threat from foreign cul-
tures, concluding that both theories present valid explanations to why certain groups have 
Eurosceptic feelings and thus, vote for Eurosceptic parties (McLaren, 2002, p. 563).
 In addition to McLaren’s work, Hungarian political scientist Gabriella Ilonszki 
(2009) looked at another factor that might influence voters to sway voting for Eurosceptic 
parties, and that is general discontent in relations to their respective national governments 
(p.1041). She does this by looking at opinion polling in regard to people’s satisfaction with 
their economic and political systems between seven Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, and Slovakia (p.1041). 
Ilonszki (2009) noticed a divide between the CEEs, specifically that a line can be drawn 
between countries with higher rates of satisfaction—Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, 
and Bulgaria—and countries with lower degrees of satisfaction—Estonia, Slovenia, and Slo-
vakia (p.1046)  Countries with higher satisfaction rates usually had center-right Eurosceptic 
parties in power (or recently have been in power) and countries with lower rates had more 
pro-European parties in power (Ilonszki, 2009, p. 1045). Also, the countries with lower sat-
isfaction rates had stronger economic satisfaction, in addition to two of them accepting the 
Euro (Ilonszki, 2009, 1047). Ilonszki (2009) is keen in pointing out that the countries that 
had lower satisfaction rates were two newer states compared to states with higher satisfac-
tion rates (Ilonszki, 2009, p.1055). With that fact in mind, Iloszki (2002) is keen in stress-
ing the optimistic view European integration has on states that are either newer, and that 
a pessimism is present in already established states in regard to integration (p. 1055). This 
pessimism can be attributed to the fact that many of these more established states—Poland, 
Hungary—have historicaly been active in their fights to keep sovereignty and thus, integra-
tion might lose something that they fought hard for (Ilonszki, 2009, p. 1056).
 As shown by existing literature on the subject, Euroscepticism is a feature that is 
present in many political orientations and persuasions. In addition, success of Eurosceptic 
parties has shown to be reliant on general Eurosceptic feelings amongst voters and that those 
feelings are dependent on a variety of factors, such as a voter’s social background. Yet, the 
literature shows a gap in deciphering the character and nuances between the various Euros-
cepticisms present in EU member and candidate states.
Hypothesis
 If a country’s Eurosceptic movement’s political orientation is dependent on the 
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political orientation of its past resistance movements against authoritarianism, then nation-
alistic resistance movements will lead to a country having nationalistic and right-leaning 
Eurosceptic parties. 
Methods
 The author will conduct two case studies in order to isolate the connections be-
tween modern Eurosceptic parties and historical resistance movements: one on the Republic 
of Poland and one on the Kingdom of Spain. The author selected these countries because: 
a) both countries are of a similar area, population, and economic status (Spain being the 
larger, yet less stable of the two); b) both countries have experienced authoritarian regimes 
with command economies and have successfully transitioned to free-market democracies; 
and c) have experienced the rise of Eurosceptic parties in the past ten years (Law and Justice 
in Poland, and Podemos in Spain).  Each case study will look at each country’s previous 
authoritarian regimes; the opposition to each regime; the successive transition to democ-
racy; the formation of their new multi-party systems; and the connection their Eurosceptic 
party has to the aforementioned process. The latter portion of each cases study will look at 
the orientation and origin of their most prominent Eurosceptic party. The Polish study will 
examine Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)—Law and Justice in English—which has been in 
government since 2015. The Spanish study will examine Podemos, which currently holds 
the third-highest number of seats in the Spanish Cortes Generales.  
Case	Studies
Spain
 Franco’s Spain. From 1939 to Franco’s death in 1975, Spain was under the au-
thoritarian rule of General Francisco Franco. Franco and his nationalist forces won a long 
and bloody civil war that ended the democratic and pluralistic Second Spanish Republic. 
Franco declared that Spain instead will, “follow the structure of the totalitarian regimes, as in 
Italy and Germany. It will be dressed in corporative forms and will do away with liberal in-
stitutions which have poisoned the people,” (Alba, 1978, p. 175). Franco became the Cau-
dillo and established a fascist regime based on Spanish nationalism, extreme Catholic piety, 
and a state-run economy based on agriculture and natural resource extraction (Alba, 1978, 
p. 176). Censorship was rampant and civil society was reduced to state-sponsored activities, 
such as the Church, and produced an intellectual climate that historian Victor Alba (1978) 
described as being, “cloaked oppressively in gray”(p. 199). In the initial stages of Franco’s 
New State, much of the opposition was crushed during the Civil War or lived in exile in 
other Western states; these exiles did present considerable influence on their host country’s 
relations with Spain. This was one of many factors that lead to Spain’s eventual isolation and 
need to liberalize. 
 Thanks to the advocacy of Spanish exiles, the United States refused to sponsor 
Spain in their Marshall Plan (Alba, 1978, p. 199). Countries that did receive those funds, 
such as Germany and France, experienced healthy economic development and eventual 
returned to stable democracies. Spain also was isolated by the Soviet Union, with Joseph 
Stalin asserting his desire to keep Spain isolated as long as Franco was in power (Alba, 1978, 
p. 202). Neither did authoritarian regimes in Latin American support Franco political or 
financially, with Argentina’s Juan Peron refusing to send food aid in reaction to Spain’s un-
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reliability in sending machinery (Alba, 1978, p. 201).  Francoist Spain became notorious for 
its underdevelopment and income inequality: in 1960, 42% of the population depended on 
agriculture and the top 8% of Spaniards received 36% of the Gross National Product (GNP) 
(Alba, 1978, p. 223). The drastic economic situation pressured Franco’s regime to consider 
liberal economic reforms and ending censorship, both policies came arose in tandem with 
the rise of a new resistance to Franco’s regime. 
 Opposition. Even though Franco’s Nationalists defeat and purged Republican 
forces in the Civil War, survivors and the many in exile helped jumpstart the resistance in 
late-Francoist Spain. Much of the resistance during the civil war consisted of Communists, 
Anarchists, and other leftist groups. These same groups worked underground, infiltrating 
official state labor unions, and organized within these unions to elicit strikes that shook 
Franco’s confidence with the middle class and organized labor (Junco & Schubert, 2000, 
p. 276).  Strikes occurred in 1951, 1956, and 1962 (Alba, 1978, p. 224). The goals of these 
strikes were very much rooted in the poor wages and in yearnings for more decentralization 
in the workplace; even if they were not explicitly against the Franco regime, it gave enough 
of a scare to elicit economic reforms to modernize the Spanish economy. 
 Franco then set an agenda of desarrollo, or economic modernization, in order to 
improve economic conditions. These included the devaluation of the peseta, the lifting of 
restrictions on foreign investment, and the withdrawal of a number of states subsidies (Junco 
& Schubert, 200, p. 276). This lead to the reduction of the agricultural sector, increased 
urbanization, and the rise of Spain’s immense tourism industry (Junco & Schubert, 200, 
p. 279). Contrary to Franco’s wishes, desarrollo did not preserve his monopoly of power. 
Modernization came in tandem with the rise of a more pluralistic and educated populace 
who yearned for more and more opportunity. The increased plurality of Spanish society is 
reflected in the pluralistic and diverse opposition that arose, which included:
1. Students—After the Ministry of Information abolished censorship in 
1966, Spanish universities became centers of radical activism and thought 
(Coverdale, 1979, p. 9). In addition, between 1960 and 1970 the number 
of students enrolled in higher education rose 167% (Covedale, 1979, p. 10). 
The intersection of increased university attendance and open curricula made 
organizing and protests impactful and frequent. This cumulated in mass pro-
tests in 1969 which lead to Franco declaring a national state of emergency 
(Junco & Schubert, 2000, p. 278).
2. The Church—Even though the Catholic Church had special protections 
under the Francoist regime, during desarrollo many church leaders in Spain 
and Catholic lay groups became disillusioned by Francoism. The liberal 
nature of the Second Vatican Council made many clergy in Spain ques-
tion their complacency to an otherwise growingly un-Catholic regime 
(Coverdale, 1979, p. 8).
3. Regionalists—Social unrest provided an excellent opportunity for many of 
Spain’s national minorities to embrace their identities.  Economic growth 
and the end of censorship triggered the revitalization of Catalan national-
ism, characterized by a focus on gaining regional and civil rights (Junco & 
Schubert, 200, p. 278). The Basque too had a revival of nationalist feel-
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ings, but unlike the Catalans who advocated for a pluralistic Spain, the 
Basque yearned for separatism. This lead to the formation of the Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (ETA) and an increase of Basque terrorism (Junco & Schubert, 
200, p. 286).
4. Political Parties—Although the only legal party during Franco’s regime was 
his Falangist party, desarrollo encouraged many clandestine parties to reor-
ganize. By Franco’s death, the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE) and 
the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) managed to form a powerful presence 
on the Spanish political scene (Junco & Schubert, 200, p. 306). Both man-
aged to preserve their parties throughout the regime through communities 
of exiles (Alba, 1978, p. 239), yet the PCE especially had an active presence 
in late Francoist Spain, manly due to the financial support of foreign com-
munist parties and their distancing from the Soviet Union (Alba, 1978, p. 
240). Christian Democratic parties formed too in conjunction with leftist 
groups and represented many moderates in Spanish society (Alba, 1978, p. 
228).
 The Spanish resistance represented everything that the Franco regime was not: 
pluralistic, inclusive, and very much for an open and connected society that put justice and 
liberty at the center. The fact that much of the resistance either rejected or was indifferent 
to Spanish nationalism shows the possibility that such political persuasion will be limited in 
its presence in the new Spain. 
 The New Party System. Franco’s death in 1975 ushered the possibility of hav-
ing a fully democratic Spain. After 1975, a number of administrations came into power 
in order to provided political stability and facilitate the transition. It was not until Adolfo 
Suarez’s appointment in July 1976 when drastic political reform took place, leading to Spain 
first free elections since the Civil War (Gunther, Sani, & Shabad, 1988, p. 35). Over 150 
parties registered to be on the ballot in 1977, yet four parties dominated: the PSOE, the 
PCE, the centrist Union de Centro Democratio (UCD), and the rightist Alianza Popular 
(AP).  The UCD became the largest party in the Spanish Cortes with 34% of the vote, fol-
lowd by the PSOE with 29%; both the PCE and the AP received around 10%, enough to 
have a significant presence in policy making (Gunther, Sani, & Shabad, 1988, p. 38). The 
results of the 1977 election followed for he is following decade, with the Spanish voting 
mostly for either the PSOE or the UCD, both relatively centrist parties (Gunther, Sani, & 
Shabad, 1988, p. 92). This showed a general attitude amongst Spanish voters that the time 
had come for political compromise and cooperation and a rejection of ideological extremes. 
The AP, a party founded by former Francoists Manuel Fraga, fell to a sad fourth place in 
the 1977 election (Gunther, Sani, & Shabad, 1988, p. 38). Fraga’s AP eventual transformed 
itself to the Partido Popular (PP) and spearheaded the Centro Democratico, a coalition of 
Christian democratic and liberal parties. This encouraged the PP to move to the center and 
help it shed its Francoist reputation, leading to the election of PP leader Jose Maria Anzar 
as prime minister in 1996.
 Spanish Integration to the European Project. Spain aspired to join the 
European project since the times of Franco. Franco’s policy of desarrollo kick started 
Spanish integration with advocating Spain’s admission to the European Common Market 
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in 1970 (Alba, 1978, p. 229). This encouraged economic integration and opened Spain’s 
ability to export its goods to other western European states, in addition to opening up the 
ability for Spaniards to work in other states so they can send back remittances (Alba, 1978, 
p. 229). With European integration being central to Spain’s economic development, a 
majority of Spain’s political parties post-Franco became enamored in European Integration. 
All of the main Spanish parties—except the Communists—support Spain’s accession to 
the European Community.  In 1986 under the PSOE government of prime minister 
Felipe Gonzalez, Spain—along with Portugal, another former fascist state—joined into the 
European Community (Dinan, 2010, p. 76).
 Podemos.  The 2008 global financial crisis was devastating for the Spanish econ-
omy. Spain’s GDP in 2009 fell by 3.4% and unemployment doubled to 20% (Rendueles 
& Sola, 2015, p. 1). In 2011, immense popular protests broke out in Spain in rejection 
of austerity measure put in place by recommendation of the European Central Bank and 
Germany  (Rendueles & Sola, 2015, p. 1). These protests brought rise to the 15M move-
ment. Headed by a number of radical leftist groups and labor unions such as the Democracia 
Real Ya (Real Democracy Now), the movement lead immense demonstrations with the 
biggest ones held in Madrid’s Puerta Del Sol in May 2011, with over 6 million partici-
pants (Rendueles & Sola, 2015, p. 1). Granted the size of the protest, the Spanish political 
establishment represented by the PSOE and the PP failed to become proactive in regard to 
the demands of the protestors, nor did the 15M movement directly feed into an organized 
electoral force. This changed with the formation of the left-wing populist party Podemos 
in 2014 (Rendueles & Sola, 2015, p. 1).  Founded by a group of radical leftist professors, 
Podemos has managed to become the third largest party in the Cortes in the past two 
Spanish general elections (Tremlett, 2015, p. 1). Podemos can thank their success by the 
fact that from all parties present in the Spanish political scene, it is the first in a while to 
question the current political status quo while still being accessible to voters. The young 
and charismatic leader of Podemos, Pablo Iglesias, made his mark at a rally in 2013 calling 
for Spaniards to resists “financial totalitarianism” of austerity (Tremlett, 2015, p. 1). He and 
his party blame the massive inequalities in Spain to the failure of the “neoliberal establish-
ment”, which includes the EU, in satisfying the needs of the people and thus, prevent 
people from taking control of their own destinies. They too stress the importance of form-
ing bonds and solidary amongst all marginalized groups and struggles, moving away from 
classic leftist narrative of class struggle (Tremlett, 2015, p. 1). Even though they come from 
the same radical tradition as the PCE and other radical leftist groups, Podemos embraced 
social media and television. Their presence in popular media is the key reason why they 
have managed to garner so much support, especially when present radical parties fail to 
embrace new forms of communication (Tremlett, 2015, p. 1).
 Podemos does not explicitly call itself a Eurosceptic party, nor is that mentioned 
in their party platform. Spain is generally considered to be one of the least Eurosceptic 
states in the EU; even after the 2008 financial crisis, Eurobarometer results showed that 
Spaniards with negative feelings towards the EU were below the EU average (Ramos & 
Cornago, 2016, p. 1). Thus, it is unusual for Euroscepticism to a take decisive role in party 
politics. This brings into question if Podemos is actually Eurosceptic or not. When looking 
at Podemos’ voting record in the European Parliament, Podemos votes almost identically 
with other soft-Eurosceptic parties such as Greece’s Syriza and France’s National Front on 
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issues regarding further economic and political integration (Ramos & Cornago, 2016, p. 1). 
The only issues that Podemos had voting against the grain of Eurosceptics is the role of their 
Euro. Podemos very much has voted in support of keeping the common currency, a posi-
tion similar to Syriza (Ramos & Cornago, 2016, p. 1). Yet, unlike other Eurosceptic parties, 
Podemos voters are generally optimistic of the EU and hope for further integration in the 
future, under more populist and democratic vision (Ramos & Cornago, 2016, p. 1). This 
paradox shows that Podemos is strictly a soft-Eurosceptic party and that its Euroscepticism 
is more consequential than it being central to their ideology.
Poland
People’s Republic of Poland. From the end of the Second World War to 
the end of the Round Table talks of 1989, Poland was a single-party communist state. 
The Soviet Union entrenched communism in Poland in their plan in creating a layer of 
communist satellite states. The Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) was the only legal 
political force in a formerly democratic nation (Balzyca & Rapacki, 1991, p. 4). Poland 
went through periods of both extreme political repression and liberalism through its 40 
years of communist rule (Balzyca & Rapacki, 1991, p. 13). The early 1950s saw the strict 
implementation of Stalinist polices by the premiership of Bolesław Bierut. A staunch 
Stalinist, Bierut held Soviet-style purges and harshly imposed collectivization amount the 
Polish peasantry. Mass protests in 1956 lead to Bierut’s resignation and the “thaw” that 
was overseen by his successor, the moderate yet nationalistic Władysław Gomułka (Balzyca 
& Rapacki, 1991, p. 13). These included the end of agricultural collectivization and the 
opening of a small private sector (Balzyca & Rapacki, 1991, p. 13).  Gomułka’s succes-
sor Edward Gierek allowed foreign investments into Poland and borrowed heavily from 
Western European states in order to jump start Poland’s consumer goods industry (Balzyca 
& Rapacki, 1991, p. 13). Yet, those loans amounted to immense debt, austerity, and the 
eventual strikes in 1980. 
 Unlike other states in the Eastern Bloc, Poland had the unique case of having the 
Catholic Church still in a prominent position in society. It provided one of the only free 
spaces in which people can form free-accusations outside of party-sanctioned organizations 
(Balzyca & Rapacki, 1991, p. 13). Concession won after the Gomułka Thaw—such as 
the right to teach religion and publish books and newspaper— made the catholic Church 
an even more viable alternative to party-sanctioned society (Balzyca & Rapacki, 1991, p. 
5). In addition, the unsuccessful implementation of agricultural collectivization kept many 
family and village bond intact (Balzyca & Rapacki, 1991, p. 5). These independent chan-
nels provide an excellent opportunity for people to organize against the communist regime, 
creating a crucible in which developments in the relatively untouched underground to seep 
into official organizations. The Church and local neighborly bonds allowed Solidarity to 
form as a cohesive underground movement against the communist regime, especially when 
most non-communist political organizations before the Second World War were either 
completely crushed by Soviet forces or were merged with the PZPR.
 Solidarity.  In August 1980, Gdańsk workers went on strike at the Lenin Ship-
yards (Potel, 1981, p. 34). The strikes were originally economic in nature; the workers were 
protesting high prices and low wages yet, the summer strikes catapulted Solidarity to the 
forefront of Polish society and became the de facto opposition to communist rule in Poland 
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(Potel, 1981, p. 35). Solidarity mostly consisted of independent trade unionists who sought 
reforms of Polish labor system which might have led to further democratization, or what 
the 1980 Solidarity convention platform called the “Self-Governing Republic” (Kowalik, 
2012, p. 35). Instead, Solidarity managed to erode PZPR’s ideological influence on society, 
leading to an eventual altercation in 1981 which triggered premier Wojciech Jaruzelski to 
declare Martial law(Balzyca & Rapacki, 1991, p. 15). Seven years of violent crackdown and 
upheaval following martial law finally lead the PZPR to sit down with Solidarity in April 
1989 leading to the famous Round Table talks (Balzyca & Rapacki, 1991, p. 15). These 
talks ended with a keen compromise: the technical “end” of communist rule in Poland and 
free elections to the Polish Sejm that June, yet the lower house of the Sejm will have 65% 
of its seats reserved for the PZPR (Balzyca & Rapacki, 1991, p. 15). Solidary won 99 of the 
100 seats contested in the upper house and all remaining seats in the lower house (Balzyca 
& Rapacki, 1991, p. 15). The 1989 election was the first and last time Solidarity ran as an 
electoral force in Poland. The movement never had intentions to gain power, but only as 
a catalyst of change (Wightman, 1995, p. 29). Because of that, Solidarity was much more 
a collective, non-pluralistic movement were the ideology was merely patriotic and anti-
communist (Wightman, 1995, p. 30). The years following the 1989 election experienced 
the formation of various new parties and political movements, mostly of a result of divisions 
within the Solidarity movement.
 Party Formation. The 1991 election brought in the introduction of a more 
complex party system in Poland. Over 150 parties registered with Polish election authori-
ties that year, with 29 parties ending up with representation in the Sejm (Wightman, 1995, 
p.35). From the 29, three main electoral stood out and have since dominated Polish politics:
1. The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)- The SLD was formed out of the 
remnants of the old PZPR and is widely considered a post-communist 
party. It occupied the centre-left of the political spectrum and was home 
to most of Poland’s social democrats and other leftists. The party showed a 
commitment to both plural parliamentary democracy and a strong welfare 
state (Wightman, 1995, p. 39). The SLD had poor electoral performance in 
the 1991 election yet formed governments throughout the late 1990s until 
it was reduced to a minor role in policy making after the 2005 election 
(Wightman, 1995, p. 40).  
2. The Democratic Union (UD)- The UD was one of the many parties formed 
from the remnants of Solidarity’s electoral apparatus. Led by liberal Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki, the party occupied the center of Polish politics. They centered 
their platform on fiancé minister Leszek Balcerowicz’s economic liberal-
ization plans (Wightman, 1995, p. 39). The UD lost popularity after the 
1991 because of their association with the side effects of liberalization, yet 
reemerged in the 2000s as the Civic Platform (PO) with stronger electoral 
performance (Wightman, 1995, p. 40).
3. The Civic Center Accord (PC)- The PC represented the right-wing of the 
Solidarity movement. The party was central in helping Lech Wałęsa win 
the Polish presidency and prouded itself with its Solidarity connection. Lead 
by twins Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński, the party fused economic liberalism, 
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support for the working class, national Catholicism, and vehement anti-
communism (Wightman, 1995, p. 29). The UC did not perform as well as 
the other two during the 1991 election, but its successor Law and Justice 
(PiS) has managed to become one of the most electorally successful parties 
in recent Polish history (Rozworski, 2015, p. 1). 
All three electoral blocs supported European integration throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s (Dymek, 2015, p. 1). Many Poles saw joining the EU as the accumulation of what 
they have been preparing since the end of Communism, the return to Western Civilization 
(Dymek, 2015, p. 1). It was also seen as necessary in order for the SLD specifically to show 
Poles that elites were committed to modernizing and developing Poland after 40 years of 
underdevelopment. Former Polish president Aleksander Kwaśniewski—who has head the 
SLD since its inception—even presided over the ceremony in which Poland entered the 
EU (Dymek, 2015, p. 1). Yet, PC and its successor PiS had clear soft-Eurosceptic leanings. 
Political scientist Desmond Dinan (2010) even wrote in his survey EU politics that when 
Poland had their accession talks with the EU (of which were dominated by right-leaning 
politicians in Poland), Poland “behaved at times as if the EU wanted to join it” (p. 139).
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość. PiS has been in power in Poland since 2015 after win-
ning a landslide election, establishing Poland’s first majority government since the fall of 
communism (Traub, 2016, p. 1). The party is a direct descendent of the right-wing UP of 
the early 1990s and thus, having a direct link to the Solidarity. As aforementioned, the party 
was founded by the Kaczyński twins in 2001 and have been one of the two dominate par-
ty’s in Poland political seen since the mid-2000s (Traub, 2016, p. 1). The reason for PiS’s 
electoral success has been attributed to their capitalization of economic frustrations that are 
presented amount (Traub, 2016, p. 1). Many in what is known as “Poland B”. “Poland 
B” consists of the eastern and southern portions of Poland known to have experienced 
the brunt of the negative side effects of Poland’s transition to capitalism (Kowalik, 2012, 
p. 297). Thus, PiS capitalized on economic anxieties and conflated them with European 
integration, especially when other parties such as PO which has been adamant with both 
integration and liberalization (Kowalik, 2012, p. 208). Jarosław Kaczyński’s rhetoric at 
a speech to the Heritage Foundation recently has emulated that view, saying that many 
elites who have pushed for integration and liberalization, “had made no effort at changing 
the social hierarchy, which remained dominated by ex-Communists. The old elite simply 
exchanged its former political power for wealth,” (Traub, 2016, p. 1).
Conclusion
 Both Spain and Poland have both managed to form competitive democratic sys-
tems after decades of authoritarian rule. Resistance movements in both states were both 
ideological antithesis of the regime in power and used similar tactics of catch-all solidarity 
in order to form momentum in ending each authoritarian regime. The Spanish resistance 
was clearly pluralistic and liberal, while the Polish resistance was very much nationalistic 
and big-tent. These differences did not hinder the formation of competitive party systems 
in each state. Both states had their former regimes reorganize into competitive parties that 
have accept to a certain degree liberal and pro-European norm. The electoral popularity 
of the PP in Spain and the pro-Europeanism of the SLD demonstrates the attempts of for-
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mer elites to reintegrate into the political scene. Also, the orientation of both state’s main 
Eurosceptic parties demonstrate the connection of historical resistance movements and 
Euroscepticism. Polish right-wing Euroscepticism and Spanish left-wing Euroscepticism 
both can trace their roots to the radical extremes of their resistance movements, albeit either 
through direct connections to the organizations of those movements (as PiS and Solidarity) 
or in the ideology of said movements (as in Podemos and the radical leftist tradition of 
student activism).  Finally, even though both PiS and Podemos are of very different ori-
entations on the political spectrum, both parties use similar rhetoric in order to form their 
Eurosceptic ideologies: both PiS and Podemos capitalized on economic anxieties to per-
petuate Euroscepticism in addition to conflating “out of touch” elites with totalitarianism.
 Despite the clear connections presented in the case studies between resistance and 
Euroscepticism, the case studies could have been enhanced by literature about party politics 
in each respective state after the initial years of democratization. Such literature is lacking 
in the body of scholarship in regard to European party politics. Yet with these conclusions 
in mind, political scientists can have a better understanding of the nature and trajectory of 
Eurosceptic politics in addition to predicating political climates after a state transitions to a 
democratic state. 
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